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Edward Kanterian’s Ludwig Wittgenstein is a solid, accurate, well-written intel
lectual biography whose purpose in life is unclear. In keeping with the guiding
principle of the Critical Lives series of which it is part, the book seeks to place
Wittgenstein and his work in the cultural context of the modern period (i.e.,
the late nineteenth and early-to-mid twentieth centuries). The book also offers
a critical perspective on Wittgenstein’s work and the existing secondary litera
ture. These three ambitions—biography, modernity, and criticism—coexist
uneasily, making it unclear who the book’s audience is intended to be.
Although it is accurate and inclusive as a biography, it is not a rival to Ray
Monk’s Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (Penguin, 1991), to which
Kanterian pays his respects. The discussion of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is
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again accurate and thoughtful, but not enough information is presented for a
reader otherwise unfamiliar with the original work to form more than a
general idea about it. The critical discussion of the secondary literature is
selective and surprisingly tendentious. In criticizing W.W. Bartley and Colin
Wilson regarding Wittgenstein’s sexuality (194– 95), Terry Eagleton regarding
Wittgenstein’s inﬂuences (74; 160), and the idea that Wittgenstein’s work may
have been inﬂuenced by an alleged dyslexia (102), among other claims,
Kanterian is engaging in interpretive and critical battles that are of interest
to specialists, who do not need the brief biography and summary of the phil
osophy, but probably not to the nonexpert reader who wants an introduction
to the man and his work. Finally, Kanterian’s complaint that the “Wittgenstein
industry” risks obscuring the thought rather than elucidating it by publishing
so many “competing interpretations, philological debates, new ‘readings’,
introductions, textbooks for students, collections of papers, conference
proceedings, dissertations, [and so forth]” (200) strikes an oddly self-doubting
note, virtually daring the reader to question the value of the book itself (and
perhaps thus slyly recalling section 6.54 of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
in which Wittgenstein claimed that a reader who had understood the book
would thereby realize that it was all nonsense).
As far as biography goes, the book contains even-handed treatments of the
major periods in Wittgenstein’s life, from the childhood in Vienna to the root
less yet remarkably productive ﬁnal few years before Wittgenstein’s death.
Kanterian deals frankly and clearly with Wittgenstein’s several romantic
and sexual relationships with men, though he rejects the interpretation that
Wittgenstein is best understood as homosexual (107). Similarly, the question
of Wittgenstein’s religious views, and their signiﬁcance to his philosophy, gets
careful and extensive treatment, and Kanterian forcefully argues against the
interpretation that religion and ethics were central to the inspiration for the
Tractatus (50; 65 –67; 84 – 86). His claim that “The philosophy of the Tractatus
can be seen as defending science against metaphysics” (84) puts him ﬁrmly
on one side of a debate, the other side of which argues that the point of the
Tractatus is to defend ethics and religion from the self-conﬁdent nonsense of
scientism (see, for example, Robert Fogelin’s Wittgenstein [Second edition,
Routledge, 1987] at 99).
The other two aims of the book—to put Wittgenstein into the context of
modernity and to offer a critical view of the existing literature—blend
together. Kanterian makes clear early on that his intention is revisionist:
“There is . . . an imbalance between Wittgenstein’s present-day public
persona and the character of his actual work, which this book attempts to
correct” (8). I have already mentioned several of the critical debates
that Kanterian engages. He also responds critically to the claim that
Wittgenstein’s miserable experience as a primary-school teacher was central
to his later philosophy (101), and to the “romantic cult” that he perceives
regarding Wittgenstein’s several sojourns in Norway, which were typically
productive philosophically, but also apparently lonely and emotionally
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painful personally (141). More generally, Kanterian is dryly derisive of what
he appears to see as faddish interpretations of Wittgenstein’s work. For
example, he writes: “More recently, Wittgenstein has been also portrayed as
a postmodernist, a relativist, a poet (or even as a Pyrrhonist, Zen-Buddhist
or rabbinical thinker). These are strange interpretations of a man who
towards the end of his life said that his chief contribution had been in the
philosophy of mathematics” (203).
How, then, should we understand Wittgenstein? Kanterian gives us a hint
when he says, “Wittgenstein lived in the modern age, the age of intellectuals,
of charismatic writers, thinkers and artists whose lives capture the collective
imagination, since they incorporate some of the deepest tensions of moder
nity, and maybe even suggest some solutions to them” (8). Many of
Kanterian’s interpretive positions seem to represent a desire to understand
Wittgenstein as a representative modern and to reject interpretations that
are inspired by more recent intellectual trends. Thus, for example,
Kanterian rejects the claim that Wittgenstein’s work was in some way
inﬂuenced by his putative homosexuality (see the story of Barry Pink on
pp. 194 – 95), but endorses Monk’s quasi-Freudian assessment that
Wittgenstein was tormented by the conﬂict between romantic love and sexu
ality of any kind (134). Similarly, in rejecting the claim that religion and ethics
were primary in the genesis of the Tractatus, Kanterian argues that
Wittgenstein’s experience in the First World War was transformative,
echoing a major theme of twentieth-century literature: “Questions about life
and death were of personal not philosophical concern to Wittgenstein at this
time. . . . To claim some kind of unity between his logical investigations
and his religious problems is to romanticize the former and trivialize the
latter” (66). As another example, the emphasis that Kanterian puts on
Wittgenstein’s embodiment of and preference for high culture, and
Wittgenstein’s belief that Western culture had become decadent (11 – 12,
137), puts the focus on conﬂicts that were alive to intellectuals of
Wittgenstein’s day, but that have since lost salience.
From the perspective of this reading, one disappointment is that Kanterian
does not develop the idea that Wittgenstein’s life might “suggest some
solutions” to the “deepest tensions of modernity” (8). The problems that
Wittgenstein struggled with, both personally and intellectually, are mostly
still our problems. Both his life and his work do indeed suggest some
methods of coping with them—“solutions” is too strong—but
Wittgenstein’s was an austere regimen. On a personal level, he appears to
have sought self-understanding and clarity about his own character,
without much hope of improving it. Philosophically, Wittgenstein hoped to
help us get out of perplexities that we could not help but fall into, a misfor
tune that we call philosophy. He did not aspire to solve those problems, or
to help us avoid falling into them in the ﬁrst place, but rather to help us alle
viate the anxiety and confusion that they cause. From this perspective, we
probably cannot learn to be different, but we can learn to suffer less.
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That is a message ﬁrmly rooted in modernity—think, for example, of Freud’s
explanation of the purpose of psychotherapy—and one that Wittgenstein
struggled to make clear to himself and to us.
– Matthew J. Moore

